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CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 473.5: SETTING
ASIDE DEFAULTS AND DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
It has often been said that "the law favors a trial on the merits."'

In affirmation of this axiom, section 4732 and old section 473a 3 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure provide a means by which a defaulted litigant can attack an otherwise final judgment of a trial court.
In 1969 the legislature enacted section 473.5,4 which supersedes sec1. Kooper v. King, 195 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625, 15 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1961);
Reed v. Williamson, 185 Cal. App. 2d 244, 248-49, 8 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (1960).
2. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 473 provides, in part: "The court may, upon such
terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal respresentative from a judgment, order,
or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Application for such relief must be accompanied by a copy of the
answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not
be granted, and must be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after such judgment, order or proceeding was taken; provided, however, that,
in the case of a judgment, order or other proceeding determining the ownership or
right to possession of real or personal property, without extending said six months
period, when a notice in writing is personally served within the State of California
both upon the party against whom the judgment, order or other proceeding has been
taken, and upon his attorney of record, if any, notifying said party and his attorney
of record, if any, that such order, judgment or other proceeding was taken against him
and that any rights said party has to apply for relief under the provisions of Section
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall expire 90 days after service of said notice,
then such application must be made within 90 days after service of such notice upon
the defaulting party or his attorney of record, if any, whichever service shall be
later."
3. Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 722, § 2, at 1966, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 473a (effective until July 1, 1970) provides: "When from any cause the summons in an action
has not been personally served on the defendant, the court may allow, on such terms
as may be just, such defendant or his legal representatives, at any time within one
year after the rendition of any judgment in such action, to answer to the merits of
the original action; provided, however, that, without extending said one year period, in
the case of a judgment, order or other proceeding determining the ownership or right
to possession of real or personal property, when a notice in writing is personally
served within or without the State of California both upon said defendant and upon
his attorney of record, if any, that such judgment had been rendered against him and
that any rights said defendant has to apply for relief under Section 473a of the Code of
Civil Procedure shall expire 180 days after service of said notice, then the time within
which said defendant or his legal representatives may apply for such relief shall not
exceed 180 days after said service of said notice upon said defendant or his attorney of
record, if any, whichever service shall be later."
4. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 473.5 (operative July 1, 1970) provides:
"(a) When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party
in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against
him in such action, he may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside such default
[1291]
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tion 473a effective July 1, 1970.' The purpose of this Note is to acquaint the reader with the effect of this statutory change and the rules
governing attack on default judgments by comparing pertinent provisions of section 473 and old section 473a with those of new section
473.5.
Background and Present Statutory Scheme
At common law a trial court had complete power over its proceedings and could amend, modify, or vacate any interlocutory motion or
order.6 Even after final judgment the court retained these powers until
the end of the term. 7 Since historically it was the purpose of terms of
court to give finality to judgments, 8 it was not until the expiration of
the term that the power of a trial court over its judgment ceased.'
In addition the courts had the power to vacate their judgments under
the common law writs of coram nobis, coram vobis and audita querela' ° when the winning party engaged in wrongful acts or when
or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. Such notice of motion shall be
served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of:
(i)
two years after entry of a default judgment against him; or (ii) 180 days after
service on him of a written notice that such default or default judgment has been
entered.
"(b)
A notice of motion to set aside a default or default judgment and for leave
to defend the action shall designate as the time for making the motion a date not
less than 10 nor more than 20 days after filing of such notice, and it shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that such party's lack of actual notice in
time to defend the action was not caused by his avoidance of service or inexcusable
neglect. The party shall serve and file with such notice a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading proposed to be filed in the action.
"(c)
Upon a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period
permitted by subdivision (a) and that his lack of actual notice in time to defend the
action was not caused by his avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it may set
aside the default or default judgment on such terms as may be just and allow such
party to defend the action."
5. This is part of a broad revision of Title 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
proposed by the Judicial Council of California. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1969 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 27 [hereinafter cited

as 1969

JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT].

The proposal, with some modification, was intro-

duced in the legislature as S.B. 503 in the 1969 Regular Session. It has been passed
and signed and will become effective on July 1, 1970. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 30,
at 3375.
6. 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 140, 194 (5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as
FREEMAN]; 30 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1941).
7. 1 FREEMAN §§ 140, 194.
8. 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
6.09, at 1485, 1489 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]; Comment, Setting Aside Default Judgments in Florida, 16
U. MIAMI L. REV. 109, 116 (1962).
9. 1 FREEMAN §§ 141, 196; 30 CALIF. L. REV. 74 (1941).
10. 7 MOORE V 60.13-.14; Comment, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV., supra note 8,at 116.
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changes in status requiring relief occurred after rendition of judgment. 1
A final judgment could also be vacated by independent action in
equity12 for fraud, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
These ancillary remedies of the common law have largely been
replaced by statutes which provide the same grounds for setting judgments aside.' 4 Today most jurisdictions have special provisions permitting a defendant to set aside a default judgment upon application within
a limited time, if he can show either that he did not have actual knowledge of the pending action and has a good defense on the merits, or
that he has equitable grounds for vacating the judgment. 15 California
Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and old section 473a are typical
of these statutory provisions.' 6 Section 473a affords a defendant an
opportunity to defend on the merits if he has not received personal
notice.' 7 Section 473 provides a party relief from "a judgment, order,
1 FREEMAN §§ 199, 257; 13 CALIF. L. Rnv. 361, 362 (1925).
12. 7 MooR f 60.36; Comment, 16 U. Mimi L. RPv., supra note 8, at 116-17.
13. F. JAMES, Crv. PRocEDURE § 11.8, at 546 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
JAMs].
14. Id. § 11.1, at 519 n.9; Comment, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV., supra note 8, at 116.
Such statutes presuppose that jurisdiction was obtained over the defendant. JAMES § 11.4,
at 532. Terms of court were abolished in 1879 by adoption of CALIFORNIA CoNsrrruTION art VI, § 5. See 30 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1941). Thereafter, California courts
had no power to alter their judgments in matters of substance without statutory
authority. See 1 FREEMAN § 141, at 272.
15. Fraud or excusable mistake are sufficient equitable grounds. See JAMES §
11.4, 11.5, at 532, 534. The time limit provided under these statutory provisions is
often one year. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 50(7) (Smith-Hurd 1968) (one
year or 90 days after written notice); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 317 (McKinney Supp.
1969-70) (five years), N.Y. Civ. PRc. R. 5015 (McKinney 1963) (one year); Wis.
STAT. AN. § 269.46 (Supp. 1969) (one year); FED. R. Cv. P. 60(b) (one year).
The federal rule was adapted from section 473 of the California Civil Code. See 7
MOORE j 60.10[5].
16. See JAmEs § 11.4, at 532 n.2. Sections 473 and 473a first appeared in 1853,
in combination, as section 68 of the Practice Act of California: "The court may likewise, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, after notice to the adverse party,
allow upon such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding
in other particulars, and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time
limited by this Act; and may upon such terms as may be just, and upon payment of
costs, relieve a party or his legal representatives, from a judgment order or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect, when from any cause the summons and a copy of the complaint in an action
have not been personally served on the defendant, the court may allow on such terms
as may be just, such defendant or his legal representatives, at any time within six
months after the rendition of any judgment in such action, to answer to the merits of
the original action." Cal. Prac. Act 1853, § 68 (H. Labatt ed. 1856).
Section 68 was codified as section 473 of the 1871 Code of Civil Procedure. Since
1871, the section has been amended several times. E.g., Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 722, § 1,
at 1965-66; Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, H§ 34, 35, at 1851-52; Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 159,
§ 1, at 242-43.
17. Zobel v. Zobel, 151 Cal. 98, 100, 90 P. 191 (1907); accord, People v. One
11.
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or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvert-

ence, surprise or excusable neglect,"' 8 and the term "other proceed-

ing" has been interpreted to include a default judgment.' 9
Although sections 473 and 473a overlap in the sense that they
both may offer relief from default judgments, they cover entirely different classes of cases. While old section 473a applies only where there
has been no personal service of summons, section 473 applies where a
defendant may have been served but seeks relief from a default that has
been brought about by his own omission."
Further, section 473a explicitly applies only to defendants, while section 473 entitles both plaintiffs and defendants to the vacation of a judgment or order. 2 '
Liberal access to the remedy provided by these sections is favored
by the courts.2 2 As a general rule, a favorable ruling on a motion
brought under section 473 or old section 473a will be reversed on appeal only where the appellate court is forced to find clear error or
abuse of discretion. 23 An unfavorable ruling on such a motion, however, will receive closer scrutiny.2" In addition, where the record on
appeal is doubtful and the decision in the lower court has been against
granting relief, the appellate court will readily intercede in favor of
granting the relief sought.2 5
Section 473 and old section 473a are remedial statutes, and under
1941 Chrysler, 81 Cal. App. 2d 18, 21, 183 P.2d 368, 370 (1947).
Sections 473 and 473a are both remedial statutes. Slack v. Murray, 175 Cal. App.
2d 558, 562, 346 P.2d 826, 828 (1959). Section 473a also affords relief to a third
party defendant. See 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
18. Section 473 also covers the amendment of pleadings and the correction of
clerical errors.
19. Brockman v. Wagenbach, 152 Cal. App. 2d 603, 615, 313 P.2d 659, 668
(1957).
20. Id. at 615, 313 P.2d at 667; Doxey v. Doble, 12 Cal. App. 2d 62, 64-66, 54
P.2d 1143, 1145 (1936).
21. Olson v. Olson, 148 Cal. App. 2d 479, 482, 306 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1957);
Lemon v. Hubbard, 10 Cal. App. 471, 476, 102 P. 554, 556 (1909).
22. Kooper v. King, 195 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625, 15 Cal. Rptr. 848, 850 (1961);
Slack v. Murray, 175 Cal. App. 2d 558, 562, 346 P.2d 826, 828 (1959); Beckett v.
Bobbitt, 180 Cal. App. 2d 921, 924, 4 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1960);
see In re Cardenas, 194 Cal. App. 2d 849, 853-54, 15 Cal. Rptr. 238, 241 (1961).
Although it is generally true that the courts have been liberal in this area, they
have, in one important sense, restricted the application of section 473a. See text
accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
23. Freeman v. Goldberg, 55 Cal. 2d 622, 625, 361 P.2d 244, 246, 12 Cal. Rptr.
668, 670 (1961); Kooper v. King, 195 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625, 15 Cal. Rptr. 848,
850 (1961); Reed v. Williamson, 185 Cal. App. 2d 244, 248-49, 8 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42
(1961).
24. Slack v. Murray, 175 Cal. App. 2d 558, 562, 346 P.2d 826, 828 (1959).
25. Beckett v. Bobbitt, 180 Cal. App. 2d 921, 924, 4 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (Super.
Ct. App. Dep't 1960); accord, Kooper v. King, 195 Cal. App. 2d 621, 625, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 848, 850 (1961).
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California law remedial statutes are cumulative in nature.2" The remedy afforded by section 473 and 473a is but one of six methods of
direct attack on judgments in California. 27 An unsuccessful attempt to
obtain relief under any one of these methods, therefore, does not
preclude recourse to any of the others. Thus, after failing to get relief
under section 473 or old section 473a, a party may, for example, try a
separate suit in equity.28
The New Section
A successful motion under new section 473.5 requires that a party
(1) serve and file a notice of motion within the appropriate time limit
and within a reasonable time after knowledge of the default or default
judgment, no matter how that knowledge was acquired; (2) present the
court with the notice of motion, an affidavit that the default was not
caused by avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, and a copy of the
proposed pleading showing a meritorious defense; and (3) be prepared
to refute a claim of laches or estoppel raised by the opposing party.
If these burdens are borne successfully, the court will grant relief under
section 473.5.
The changes in the law resulting from the enactment of section
473.5 can best be understood by comparing that section with section
473 and old section 473a. A cursory reading of section 473.5 indicates
possible changes in the law by the provisions of notice, time limits, inexcusable neglect, court discretion in granting relief, and requirements
of documentation.
a.

Notice

Despite an apparent change, the notice requirement is the same
under new section 473.5 as it was under old section 473a. Section
473.5 merely codifies the interpretation the courts have placed on section 473a. Under the latter section relief may be invoked when a
26. Miller v. Lee, 52 Cal. App. 2d 10, 16, 125 P.2d 627, 631 (1942); 31 CALn.
L. REv. 600, 603 (1943).
27. The five other means are (1) by appeal; (2) by motion for a new trial;
(3) by motion when the conclusions of law are inconsistent with the findings, or the
judgment is inconsistent with a special verdict; (4) by motion when the judgment is
void on its face; (5) by an independent suit in equity, when the judgment is regular
on its face, but extrinsically void for want of jurisdiction or by reason of fraud or mistake. 30 CALIw. L. Rnv. 74, 75 n.8 (1941). Compare Ransom v. Los Angeles City
High School Dist., 129 Cal. App. 2d 500, 507, 277 P.2d 455, 459-60 (1954), with
Fletcher v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 468, 475, 250 P. 195, 198 (1926).
28. 31 CALiF. L. REv. 600, 603 (1943); see Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47
Cal. 2d 540, 558, 305 P.2d 20, 32 (1956). This is so even though section 473 was
intended to incorporate the equitable powers of the court. Olson v. Olson, 148 Cal.
App. 2d 479, 482, 306 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1957).
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summons has not been "personally served" on the defendant. Under
new section 473.5 relief is available when a summons has not resulted
in "actual notice,"2 9 a term that is interpreted by the California courts
to mean knowledge.3 0
The courts first held that section 473a was in the nature of an
automatic remedy, available whenever service of summons was made
by any method other than personal service. 31 One court went so far
as to say that "a person served by publication may come in at any
time within a year and have the judgment set aside. '32 This early
view has not been followed rigidly for many years though, and more
recent cases hold that constructive service will generally defeat a claim
under either section 473 or section 473a:
Service by publication and mailing a copy of the complaint and
summons is not personal service . . . . [However], this is sufficient to make a prima facie case for relief . . . . The law pre-

sumes from the fact of constructive service only that the failure to
answer is due to lack of notice of the service. But the provision
is not designed to afford relief from a judgment which may be
validly entered upon constructive service to those who with full
knowledge of such service upon them, by reason of receipt of a
copy of the summons and complaint through the mail, remain
inactive. 33

Relief has been denied under old section 473a where a party,
bedridden but capable of transacting business, received no personal
service, but was informed of the contents of the summons and complaint
and of the pendency of the action by different persons on several occa29. The terms "actual notice" and "constructive notice" and the relation between
them are defined in sections 18 and 19 of the Civil Code.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 18 provides:
"Notice is: 1. Actual-which consists in express
information of a fact; or,
"2. Constructive-which is imputed by law."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 19 provides: "Every person who has actual notice of circumstance sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he
might have learned such fact."
30. See Santa Rosa Bank v. White, 139 Cal. 703, 705, 73 P. 577, 578 (1903);
Brockman v. Wagenbach, 152 Cal. App. 2d 603, 611, 313 P.2d 659, 665 (1957);
Witherow v. United Am. Ins. Co., 101 Cal. App. 334, 339, 281 P. 668, 671 (1929).
The older cases which state that notice and knowledge are not synonymous use
"notice" strictly in the sense of a legal instrument or procedure and not in the broad
sense of actual notice of a fact. See Williams v. Bergin, 108 Cal. 166, 171, 41
P. 287, 288-89 (1895).
31. See Parkside Realty Co. v. MacDonald, 166 Cal. 426, 137 P. 21 (1913).
32. Id. at 434, 137 P. at 25.
33. Palmer v. Lantz, 215 Cal. 320, 324, 9 P.2d 821, 823 (1932) (citations omitted); accord, Pierson v. Fischer, 131 Cal. App. 2d 208, 212, 280 P.2d 491, 493
(1955); Dambach, Personal Jurisdiction: Some Current Problems and Modern Trends,
5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 198, 210 (1958). Contra, Tucker v. Tucker, 59 Cal. App. 2d 557,
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sions during a time within which an appearance might have been
made."4 Thus, the rewording of section 473.5, in effect, codifies the
judicial gloss placed on section 473a.
Time Limits
New section 473.5 provides two time periods during which a defendant can move to set aside a default or default judgment. The
basic maximum period during which a defendant may move for relief
is extended from one year under section 473a to two years under section 473.5. Section 473.5 also contains a new provision which allows
the plaintiff to shorten the maximum period to 180 days by serving
the defendant with written notice of the default or default judgment.
This latter provision is identical to a provision in old section 473a except that its scope is much broader, for the 180 day provision in section
473a applies only to actions "determining the ownership or right to
possession of real or personal property." The net effect of these two
time limits in new section 473.5, taken together, apparently is to
lengthen the time during which default judgments are subject to attack, since in many default situations the defendant cannot be reached
and so never receives actual notice of the proceeding by service of
process,8 5 and he may be equally unavailable when the plaintiff later
attempts to notify him of the judgment.
The two year period under new section 473.5 begins to run from
the entry of the default judgment, and the 180 day period commences
at the date of service of a written notice of the entry of either a default
or default judgment. 36 The defendant may stop the running of either
of these time periods by serving on the plaintiff and filing with the court
a notice of motion, which informs the other party of the place and time
of the hearing on the motion to set aside the default or default judgment.3 7
b.

559, 139 P.2d 348, 350 (1943).
34. Boland v. All Persons, 160 Cal. 486, 117 P. 547 (1911).
35. E.g., Palmer v. Lantz, 215 Cal. 320, 324, 9 P.2d 821, 823 (1932); Parsons
v. Weis, 144 Cal. 410, 77 P. 1007 (1904).
36. Under section 473a, the running of the one year period is measured from the
entry of the default judgment. Brockman v. Wagenbach, 152 Cal. App. 2d 603, 616,
313 P.2d 659, 668 (1957); Doxey v. Doble, 12 Cal. App. 2d 62, 54 P.2d 1143 (1936).
This contrasts with section 473 where the measurement of the time period begins from
the entry of the default. Wyoming Pac. Oil Co. v. Preston, 171 Cal. App. 2d 735, 741,
341 P.2d 732, 735 (1959); Castagnoli v. Castagnoli, 124 Cal. App. 2d 39, 41, 268
P.2d 37, 38 (1954); Doxey v. Doble, 12 Cal. App. 2d 62, 54 P.2d 1143 (1936).
37. Sample forms for the notice of motion, supporting affidavits, and counteraffidavits for actions under section 473a may be found in 5 CAr.. PRACTIcE §§ 31:
48-52 (1968).
CAL.CODE CIV. PROC. § 1005.5 provides in part: "A motion upon all the grounds
stated in the written notice thereof is deemed to have been made and to be pending be-
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c. Inexcusable Neglect
New section 473.5 adds "inexcusable neglect" as a cause for denying relief to a defendant who has suffered a default or default judgment. The section provides that the notice of motion "shall be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that such party's lack of actual notice was not caused by his avoidance of service or inexcusable
neglect," and that the court shall base its decision for or against relief
in part on a finding that the moving party's "lack of actual notice was
not caused by his avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect." These
new provisions change the present law slightly by increasing the petitioner's initial burden of proof over that required under old section
473a. Under the old section, the petitioning defendant need only
show that he was not personally served in order to make out a prima
facie case for relief from the default or default judgment.3 8 Once the
petitioner has shown lack of personal service, the plaintiff in the original
action, in order to prevent the default or default judgment from being
set aside, must show actual notice, 3 9 inexcusable neglect, or estoppel."0
Under either the new or the old section, however, whether a given fact
situation
constitutes inexcusable neglect is within the discretion of the
41
court.

fore the court for all purposes, upon the due service and filing of the notice of motion ...... This s' atute, passed in 1953, resolves what would otherwise be an ambiguity in section 473.5 between subdivision (a), which prescribes that the notice of
motion shall be served and filed within the prescribed time limit, and subdivision (c),
which requires "a finding by the court that the motion was made within the period
permitted by subdivision (a)." Prior to the passage of section 1005.5, the courts
disagreed regarding the action required within the prescribed time to secure relief under
section 473. All agreed, however, that if both the notice of motion and motion
proper were completed within the time limit, the court retained jurisdiction to consider
and pass on the motion after the expiration of the period. Marston v. Rood, 62 Cal.
App. 2d 435, 436, 144 P.2d 863, 864 (1944); Roseborough v. Campbell, 46 Cal. App.
2d 257, 261, 115 P.2d 839, 841 (1941); see Gray v. Laufenberger, 195 Cal. App. 2d
875, 880, 15 Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (Super. Ct. App. Dep't 1961). A strong line of authority held, however, that if only the notice of motion were served and filed within
the prescribed time, it was insufficient to secure relief. In re Yoder, 199 Cal. 699,
702, 251 P. 205, 207 (1926); Brownell v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 703, 709-10, 109
P. 91, 94 (1910); Barry v. Barry, 124 Cal. App. 2d 107, 111, 268 P.2d 147, 150
(1954). This line of authority ended with Gardner v. Trevaskis, 158 Cal. App. 2d
410, 322 P.2d 545 (1958), which held, relying on section 1005.5, that the service
and filing of the notice of motion within the prescribed time was sufficient to secure
relief under section 473 and that the motion proper need not be made within the six
month period. Applying this decision to section 473.5, it becomes apparent that
serving and filing the notice of motion proper, will be sufficient to stop the running of
the two year period.
38. Palmer v. Lantz, 215 Cal. 320, 324, 9 P.2d 821, 823 (1932).
39. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
40. See text accompanying notes 57-58 infra.
41. Baxter v. Prescott, 158 Cal. App. 2d 531, 533, 322 P.2d 1008, 1010 (1958).
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Cases decided under section 473 indicate how "inexcusable neglect" will be interpreted under new section 473.5, for section 473 affords relief from a default judgment suffered through excusable neglect, the opposite of "inexcusable neglect" as used in section 473.5. In
interpreting section 473, the courts have held that to warrant relief "a
litigant's neglect must have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances." 4 2 An example of inexcusable neglect is where the default occurs as the result of a deliberate refusal to
act and relief is sought after a change of mind.43 Perhaps the best
statement discussing what considerations define inexcusable neglect is
found in Elms v. Elms:4 4
It is the duty of every person . . .to take timely and adequate
steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless in arranging for his defense he shows
that he has exercised such reasonable diligence as a man of
ordinary prudence usually bestows on important business his motion for relief under section 473 will be denied. Courts neither
act as guardians for incompetent parties nor for those who are
grossly careless of their own affairs. . . . The law frowns upon
setting aside default judgments resulting from inexcusable neglect
of the complainant. The only occasion for the application of
section 473 is where a party is unexpectedly placed in a situation
to his injury without fault or negligence of his own and against
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded. Neither inadvertence nor neglect will warrant judicial relief unless it may
reasonably be classified as of the excusable variety upon a sufficient showing. 5
If inexcusable neglect exists, it is immaterial whether the neglect
is traceable to the party himself or to his attorney.46 For example, in
Hummel v. Hummel,4 r the attorneys apparently failed to recognize the
significance of a document in time to avert the entry of a default judgment. This negligence was chargeable to the client, and relief sought
under section 473 was denied. In Galper v. Galper,4 the court held
that a failure to file within the prescribed time limit set by section 473
could not be excused by the defendant's reliance on a written statement
by his counsel to the effect that the allowable time period ran from the
entry of the default judgment rather than from the default. Thus, the
courts have been very strict in determining what constitutes excusable
42. Elms v. Elms, 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 513, 164 P.2d 936, 939 (1946).
43. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Long, 175 Cal. App. 2d 149, 345 P.2d
568 (1959).
44. 72 Cal. App. 2d 508, 164 P.2d 936 (1946).
45. Id. at 513, 164 P.2d at 939.
46. Galper v. Galper, 162 Cal. App. 2d 391, 399, 328 P.2d 487, 492 (1958);
Hummel v. Hummel, 161 Cal. App. 2d 272, 277, 326 P.2d 542, 546 (1958).
47. 161 Cal. App. 2d 272, 326 P.2d 542 (1958).
48. 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 328 P.2d 487 (1958).
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neglect. It is fair to presume that courts will continue this policy in
applying new section 473.5.
d.

Discretion of the Court

Under section 473.5 a court is given discretion to grant relief if
the defendant's notice of motion has been made in "a reasonable time"
within the maximum statutory time limits "on such terms as may be
just." Old section 473a contains the phrase "on such terms as may be
just" but does not contain the phrase "a reasonable time." Both
phrases appear in section 473 to define the parameters of a court's
discretion, 9 however, so the cases decided under that section again may
be examined to see how the new term "reasonable time" will be interpreted under new section 473.5.
What constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact within the
discretion of the trial court, unless the circumstances demonstrate unreasonable delay as a matter of law."' For example, it has been held
that it is within a judge's discretion to find that a delay of two to five
months in filing for relief after discovery of the default is unreasonable
so as to bar relief. 51 In other cases, it has been found within the
judge's discretion to excuse equally long delays if the delay was reasonable and the adverse party was not prejudiced thereby.5 2 Of course, a
court has no discretion to grant relief by finding that delay longer than
the applicable statutory limit of 180 days or two years is reasonable.5 3
Even notice of motion within a reasonable time not exceeding the
applicable statutory limit does not guarantee that relief will be granted.
The rights or status of the other party may have become altered to such
an extent that the granting of relief will not be on "such terms as may
be just." This would be particularly applicable, for example, in actions for divorce or dissolution of marriage54 where the party in whose
49. The judge's discretion is legal, not arbitrary. Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal. 2d
274, 279, 148 P.2d 611, 614 (1944).
50. Baxter v. Prescott, 158 Cal. App. 2d 531, 534, 322 P.2d 1008, 1010 (1958).
51. Benjamin v. Dalmo Mfg. Co., 31 Cal. 2d 523, 529, 190 P.2d 593, 596 (1948)
(31/2 months' delay); City of Pac. Grove v. Hamilton, 100 Cal. App. 2d 508, 511, 224

P.2d 19, 21 (1950) (5% months); Mercantile Collection Bureau v. Pinheiro, 84 Cal.
App. 2d 606, 609, 191 P.2d 511, 512 (1948) (two months).
52. Waite v. Southern Pac. Co., 192 Cal. 467, 471, 221 P. 204, 206 (1923)

(5

month delay).
53. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
54. A decree of dissolution of marriage apparently may be rendered upon the
default of a party under California's new Family Law Act. ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO
FAMILY LAW

ACT

PRACTICE

40-41, 128-29 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1970).

Com-

pare CAL. CIV. CODE § 4511 (operative Jan. 1, 1970) with Cal. Civ. Code § 130
(1872), as amended, Cal. Code Amnds. 1873-74, ch. 612, § 32, at 191. A defaulting spouse, then, may seek relief under section 473.5 as he can under section 473.
E.g., Heathman v. Vant, 172 Cal. App. 2d 639, 343 P.2d 104 (1959).
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favor the default judgment was rendered has remarried and the exspouse later seeks to vacate the judgment by a motion brought under
either section 473 or new section 473.5. In this situation, the status
of the remarried spouse would be so altered in reliance on the default
judgment that the application of section 473 or section 473.5 would not
be just; consequently, the court would have discretion to deny the relief
sought.5 5
e.

Documentation

Section 473.5 requires that the defendant's notice of motion to
set aside a default or default judgment be accompanied (1) by an affidavit stating under oath that a party's lack of actual notice was not
caused by his avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect and (2) by
a copy of the answer, motion, or other pleading to be filed in the action.
The requirement of the affidavit under oath is new and increases the
documentation above that required under either section 473 or old section 473a. Under section 473 the notice of motion need only be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading. The documentation requirements under old section 473a are even less rigorous; although the requirement for the showing of a meritorious defense
amounts to much the same thing as a copy of the answer, it is sufficient
for a section 473a affidavit to state only the ultimate facts of the defense, and not the probative facts."6
Under both section 473 and old section 473a, the burden of proving injury due to the neglect of the other party is on the party in whose
favor the default or default judgment was rendered.5 7 That party's
counter-affidavit, to be effective, must state the grounds of laches or
estoppel;15 a mere attempt to controvert the truth of the petitioner's
allegations will not suffice. 59 Apparently, the showing required for an
effective counter-affidavit under section 473.5 will remain the same as
under section 473 and old section 473a.
55. Compare N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 317 (McKinney 1963) which specifically
exempts actions for divorce, annulment, or partition from its operation. The only
reason for such exemptions would seem to be the prevalence of estoppel. It is submitted that leaving the application of a remedial statute to the discretion of the court
in all cases, as California has done, preserves flexibility and is preferable for that
reason.
56. Thompson v. Sutton, 50 Cal. App. 2d 272, 279, 122 P.2d 975, 980 (1942).
57. The hearing on a motion is an adversary action and the grounds for denial
of relief must be proven. The burden of proving laches or estoppel is on the party
in whose favor the default was taken. In re Stanfield, 32 Cal. App. 2d 283, 89 P.2d
696 (1939).
58. Thompson v. Sutton, 50 Cal. App. 2d 272, 280, 122 P.2d 975, 980 (1942).
59. Id.
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Conclusion
The California legislature, in replacing section 473a with section
473.5, has not made a sweeping revision of the law relating to motions
to set aside defaults or default judgments. Several provisions, while
indicating a change from the former law, are largely codifications of
court interpretations of the old law. An example of such a provision is
the requirement under 473.5 that the defendant not have "actual notice" of the action against him. 60
New section 473.5 does, however, make several significant changes
in the law. The most important is the increase from one year to two
years in the maximum time period in which a default judgment may be
set aside. Such a change is in accord with the desire to permit a defendant his day in court if he has a meritorious defense but has not
received notice of the proceeding. In conflict with this desire, however, is the desire that judgments be final. To balance the interests of
the defendant with those of the plaintiff, therefore, new section 473.5
provides for changes in the law to help assure the finality of default
judgments. It provides, for example, that the plaintiff can shorten the
allowable period for a defendant's motion to set aside a default or default judgment to 180 days, regardless of the nature of the original
action, by giving the defendant written notice of the default. Further,
the greater documentation required under new section 473.561 will discourage sharp practice and frivolous motions by increasing the movant's burden of proof. Finally, the new requirements that the defendant must move to set aside a default or default judgment within a reasonable time62 and show that he was not guilty of "inexcusable neglect"6 3 will tend to lessen the effect of the two year limitation.
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